Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An Experimental Investigation of Political Selection

Autor(en)

Thomas Markussen, Jean-Robert Tyran

Abstrakt

In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates’ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

Externe Organisation(en)

University of Copenhagen

Journal

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Band

144

Seiten

204-218

Anzahl der Seiten

15

ISSN

0167-2681

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006

Publikationsdatum

12-2017

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

506013 Politische Theorie, 502027 Politische Ökonomie

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/ee6d5fe4-745f-4e9a-8f36-3b1395be792e