Medical insurance and free choice of physician shape patient overtreatment: A laboratory experiment

Autor(en): Steffen Huck, Gabriele Lünser, Florian Spitzer, Jean-Robert Tyran
Abstrakt: In a laboratory experiment designed to capture key aspects of the interaction between physicians and patients, we study the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician, including observability of physicians’ market shares. Medical treatment is an example of a credence good: only the physician knows the appropriate treatment, the patient does not. Even after a consultation, the patient is not sure whether he received the right treatment or whether he was perhaps overtreated. We find that with insurance, moral hazard looms on both sides of the market: patients consult more often and physicians overtreat more often than in the baseline condition. Competition decreases overtreatment compared to the baseline and patients therefore consult more often. When the two institutions are combined, competition is found to partially offset the adverse effects of insurance: most patients seek treatment, but overtreatment is moderated.
Organisation(en): Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
Externe Organisation(en): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH, Center for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Band: 131
Seiten: 78-105
Anzahl der Seiten: 28
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.009
Publikationsdatum: 2016
Peer-reviewed: Ja
ÖFOS 2012: 502045 Verhaltensökonomie, 502013 Industrieökonomik, 502010 Finanzwissenschaft
Schlagwörter
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete: Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Link zum Portal: https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/medical-insurance-and-free-choice-of-physician-shape-patient-overtreatment-a-laboratory-experiment(7f4ef8eb-83ee-4418-8635-d9c52e9afac8).html