Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-deterrent

Autor(en)

Jean-Robert Tyran, lars Feld

Abstrakt

Law backed by non-deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., self-imposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

Externe Organisation(en)

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

Journal

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Band

108

Seiten

135–156

Anzahl der Seiten

22

ISSN

0347-0520

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x

Publikationsdatum

2006

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

502024 Öffentliche Wirtschaft, 502045 Verhaltensökonomie

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/achieving-compliance-when-legal-sanctions-are-nondeterrent(6c4c6f82-844b-4e1e-9b1f-2aa81b84ad3e).html