Electoral Cycles in Government Policy Making: Strategic Timing of Austerity Reform Measures in Western Europe
- Autor(en)
- Daniel Strobl, Mariyana Angelova, Hanna Bäck, Wolfgang Claudius Müller
- Abstrakt
This paper investigates whether governing parties strategically time austerity policies to benefit at elections. It contributes to existing research by focusing directly on government policy output, analyzing over 1,200 welfare and taxation austerity measures in 13 Western European countries over 20 years. In line with previous research, we find that the probability that governments introduce austerity measures decreases towards elections. We introduce original hypotheses about which governments have the ability and opportunity to strategically time policy decisions. We suggest that minimal winning cabinets with leadership change (new prime ministers) face less complex bargaining environments and can credibly shift responsibility for austerity measures to the preceding government. Our empirical analyses show that these governments are most likely to strategically time austerity policies.
- Organisation(en)
- Institut für Staatswissenschaft
- Externe Organisation(en)
- Lund University
- Journal
- British Journal of Political Science
- Band
- 51
- Seiten
- 331-352
- Anzahl der Seiten
- 22
- ISSN
- 0007-1234
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000073
- Publikationsdatum
- 11-2018
- Peer-reviewed
- Ja
- ÖFOS 2012
- 506014 Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
- Schlagwörter
- ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Political Science and International Relations
- Link zum Portal
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/electoral-cycles-in-government-policy-making-strategic-timing-of-austerity-reform-measures-in-western-europe(6a54685d-00be-4ef4-809f-2f80fefaa485).html