Civic Engagement, the Leverage Effect and the Accountable State

Autor(en)

Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Tyran

Abstrakt

A classic solution to the problem of public goods (PG) is their provision through a strong state with the power to collect taxes and to mete out penalties for non-compliance. The need for voluntary collective action remains, however, because binding the state to citizen's interests requires the latter's civic engagement. As a public good in its own right, economic theory expects civic engagement to be underprovided. We conduct the first laboratory experiment in which participants can create a socially efficient central sanctioning scheme (representing the accountable state) through a prior stage of voluntary costly actions that are theoretically ruled out for strictly self-interested agents—a social dilemma. Our experimental subjects sustain civic engagement when its cost is modest, suggesting sustainable cooperation in linked social dilemmas perhaps due to a cost-benefit calculus we call “leverage.”

Organisation(en)

Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Externe Organisation(en)

Keio University, Brown University

Journal

European Economic Review

Band

156

ISSN

0014-2921

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104466

Publikationsdatum

07-2023

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

502057 Experimentelle Ökonomie, 502010 Finanzwissenschaft, 502027 Politische Ökonomie

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Economics and Econometrics, Finance

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/civic-engagement-the-leverage-effect-and-the-accountable-state(53b3df61-93d5-428e-a4f9-797051897545).html