Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time

Autor(en)

Morten Hedegaard, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Daniel Müller, Jean-Robert Tyran

Abstrakt

We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a trust game and a public good game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game and contribute more to the public good than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time.

Organisation(en)

Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Externe Organisation(en)

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, University of Copenhagen

Journal

Games and Economic Behavior

Band

128

Seiten

231-255

Anzahl der Seiten

25

ISSN

0899-8256

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.003

Publikationsdatum

07-2021

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

502045 Verhaltensökonomie, 502057 Experimentelle Ökonomie

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Economics and Econometrics, Finance

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/3df84eea-17b4-4237-9ed2-2ff25e76e87b