LEARNING TRUST
- Autor(en)
- Iris Bohnet, Steffen Huck, Jean-Robert Tyran
- Abstrakt
We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we find that providing buyers with information about sellers' trading history boosts market performance. More surprisingly, this beneficial effect of incentives for reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers' trading history. This suggests that two-sided market transparency is an important ingredient for the design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral hazard.
- Organisation(en)
- Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
- Externe Organisation(en)
- Harvard University, University College London
- Journal
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Band
- 3
- Seiten
- 322-329
- Anzahl der Seiten
- 8
- ISSN
- 1542-4766
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.322
- Publikationsdatum
- 2005
- Peer-reviewed
- Ja
- ÖFOS 2012
- 502045 Verhaltensökonomie
- Link zum Portal
- https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/de/publications/learning-trust(c6b486c2-d154-4f42-8d0b-1162a667105a).html