Disincentives from Redistribution
- Autor(en)
- Rupert Sausgruber, Axel Sonntag, Jean-Robert Tyran
- Abstrakt
We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.
- Organisation(en)
- Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Rektorat
- Externe Organisation(en)
- Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (WU), University of Copenhagen, Centre for Economic and Policy Research
- Journal
- European Economic Review
- Band
- 136
- Anzahl der Seiten
- 30
- ISSN
- 0014-2921
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103749
- Publikationsdatum
- 07-2021
- Peer-reviewed
- Ja
- ÖFOS 2012
- 502057 Experimentelle Ökonomie, 502010 Finanzwissenschaft, 502027 Politische Ökonomie
- Schlagwörter
- ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Economics and Econometrics, Finance
- Link zum Portal
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/2e8404c6-8b31-4933-8cba-2821230c34d2