Legislator Dissent as a Valence Signal

Autor(en)

Rosie Campbell, Phil Cowley, Nick Vivyan, Markus Wagner

Abstrakt

Existing research suggests that voters tend to respond positively to legislator independence due to two types of mechanism. First, dissent has an indirect effect, increasing a legislator’s media coverage and personal recognition among constituents (profile effects). Secondly, constituents react positively to dissent when this signals that the legislator has matching political or representational preferences (conditional evaluation). This article presents a third effect: dissent acts as a valence signal of integrity and trustworthiness. Consistent with the valence signalling mechanism, it uses new observational and experimental evidence to show that British voters have a strong and largely unconditional preference for legislators who dissent. The findings pose a dilemma for political systems that rely on strong and cohesive parties.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Staatswissenschaft

Externe Organisation(en)

University of London, Queen Mary University of London, Durham University

Journal

British Journal of Political Science

Band

49

Seiten

105-128

Anzahl der Seiten

24

ISSN

0007-1234

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000223

Publikationsdatum

2016

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

506014 Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Sociology and Political Science

Link zum Portal

https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/de/publications/legislator-dissent-as-a-valence-signal(930acab0-de8b-4573-9938-e009f4c3481b).html