The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments: A sequential approach

Autor(en)

Alejandro Ecker, Thomas Meyer, Wolfgang Claudius Müller

Abstrakt

Multiparty government in parliamentary democracies entails bargaining over the payoffs of government participation, in particular the allocation of cabinet positions. While most of the literature deals with the numerical distribution of cabinet seats among government parties, this article explores the distribution of individual portfolios. It argues that coalition negotiations are sequential choice processes that begin with the allocation of those portfolios most important to the bargaining parties. This induces conditionality in the bargaining process as choices of individual cabinet positions are not independent of each other. Linking this sequential logic with party preferences for individual cabinet positions, the authors of the article study the allocation of individual portfolios for 146 coalition governments in Western and Central Eastern Europe. The results suggest that a sequential logic in the bargaining process results in better predictions than assuming mutual independence in the distribution of individual portfolios.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Staatswissenschaft

Journal

European Journal of Political Research

Band

54

Seiten

802-818

Anzahl der Seiten

17

ISSN

0304-4130

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12108

Publikationsdatum

11-2015

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

506014 Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Sociology and Political Science

Link zum Portal

https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/de/publications/the-distribution-of-individual-cabinet-positions-in-coalition-governments-a-sequential-approach(6cc14620-923c-4c99-9c51-58c8c1339310).html