Electoral Cycles in Government Policy Making: Strategic Timing of Austerity Reform Measures in Western Europe

Autor(en)

Daniel Strobl, Mariyana Angelova, Hanna Bäck, Wolfgang Claudius Müller

Abstrakt

This paper investigates whether governing parties strategically time austerity policies to benefit at elections. It contributes to existing research by focusing directly on government policy output, analyzing over 1,200 welfare and taxation austerity measures in 13 Western European countries over 20 years. In line with previous research, we find that the probability that governments introduce austerity measures decreases towards elections. We introduce original hypotheses about which governments have the ability and opportunity to strategically time policy decisions. We suggest that minimal winning cabinets with leadership change (new prime ministers) face less complex bargaining environments and can credibly shift responsibility for austerity measures to the preceding government. Our empirical analyses show that these governments are most likely to strategically time austerity policies.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Staatswissenschaft

Externe Organisation(en)

Lund University

Journal

British Journal of Political Science

Band

51

Seiten

331-352

Anzahl der Seiten

22

ISSN

0007-1234

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000073

Publikationsdatum

11-2018

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

506014 Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Political Science and International Relations

Link zum Portal

https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/de/publications/electoral-cycles-in-government-policy-making-strategic-timing-of-austerity-reform-measures-in-western-europe(6a54685d-00be-4ef4-809f-2f80fefaa485).html