The dark side of the vote

Autor(en)
Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan, Jean Robert Tyran
Abstrakt

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.

Organisation(en)
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
Externe Organisation(en)
New York University, University of Copenhagen
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Band
113
Seiten
461-481
Anzahl der Seiten
21
ISSN
0899-8256
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008
Publikationsdatum
01-2019
Peer-reviewed
Ja
ÖFOS 2012
502027 Politische Ökonomie
Schlagwörter
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
Economics and Econometrics, Finance
Link zum Portal
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/de/publications/the-dark-side-of-the-vote(07c75e61-b62f-4f65-9cdb-ed848c9b13f5).html