Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
- Author(s)
- Jean-Robert Tyran, Thomas Markussen, Ernesto Reuben
- Abstract
The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Economics
- External organisation(s)
- University of Copenhagen, Columbia University in the City of New York
- Volume
- IZA DP No. 6620
- Publication date
- 2012
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502047 Economic theory
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/competition-cooperation-and-collective-choice(e4c3ac78-c27d-4293-9419-d62b4f2b6f85).html