A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy
- Author(s)
- Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran
- Abstract
We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (Quart. J. Econom. 114 (3) (1999) 817) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
- External organisation(s)
- Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (WU)
- Journal
- European Economic Review
- Volume
- 50
- Pages
- 469-485
- No. of pages
- 17
- ISSN
- 0014-2921
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.014
- Publication date
- 2006
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502045 Behavioural economics, 502024 Public economy
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/a-little-fairness-may-induce-a-lot-of-redistribution-in-democracy(dd794db5-3b89-43c0-8897-9aae10ec2a72).html