Let the Experts Decide? Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees

Author(s)
Jean-Robert Tyran, Rebecca Morton
Organisation(s)
Department of Economics
External organisation(s)
Tulane University
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
72
Pages
485-509
No. of pages
25
ISSN
0899-8256
Publication date
2011
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502027 Political economy, 502045 Behavioural economics
Keywords
Portal url
https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/let-the-experts-decide-asymmetric-information-abstention-and-coordination-in-standing-committees(b1c67161-3156-4e63-94a0-8f93f00d9bb9).html