Do institutions promote rationality?: An experimental study of the three-door anomaly

Author(s)
Jean-Robert Tyran, Tilman Slembeck
Abstract

The three-door problem is an example of a systematic violation of a key rationality postulate that has attracted much attention. In this seemingly simple individual decision task, most people initially fail to apply correctly Bayes’ Law, and to make the payoff-maximizing choice. Previous experimental studies have shown that individual learning reduces the incidence of irrational choices somewhat, but is far from eliminating it. We experimentally study the roles of communication and competition as institutions to mitigate the choice anomaly. We show that the three-door anomaly can be entirely eliminated by these institutions.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
External organisation(s)
Universität St. Gallen
Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume
54
Pages
337–350
No. of pages
14
ISSN
0167-2681
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.002
Publication date
2004
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502045 Behavioural economics
Portal url
https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/do-institutions-promote-rationality-an-experimental-study-of-the-threedoor-anomaly(a9429fca-0340-4dcc-bf9f-da795e251127).html