Disincentives from Redistribution
- Author(s)
- Rupert Sausgruber, Axel Sonntag, Jean-Robert Tyran
- Abstract
We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.
- Organisation(s)
- Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics, Rectorate
- External organisation(s)
- Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (WU), University of Copenhagen, Centre for Economic and Policy Research
- Journal
- European Economic Review
- Volume
- 136
- No. of pages
- 30
- ISSN
- 0014-2921
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103749
- Publication date
- 07-2021
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502057 Experimental economics, 502010 Public finance, 502027 Political economy
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics, Finance
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/2e8404c6-8b31-4933-8cba-2821230c34d2