Risking Other People’s Money

Autor(en)

Ola Andersson, Hakan Holm, Jean-Robert Tyran, Erik Wengström

Abstrakt

We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline condition without such incentives, we find that the decision makers respond strongly to these incentives that result in an increased risk exposure of others. However, we find that the increase in risk taking is mitigated by altruistic preferences and pro-social personality traits.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

Externe Organisation(en)

Lund University, Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Anzahl der Seiten

49

Publikationsdatum

2013

ÖFOS 2012

502047 Volkswirtschaftstheorie

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/bead950e-a4ce-4713-b47d-caccc84f8322