Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits

Autor(en)

Ola Andersson, Hakan Holm, Jean-Robert Tyran, Erik Wengström

Abstrakt

Decision-makers often face incentives to increase risk-taking on behalf of others (e.g., they are offered bonus contracts and contracts based on relative performance). We conduct an experimental study of risk-taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample, and we find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that a lack of concern for others' risk exposure hardly requires "financial psychopaths" in order to flourish, but it is diminished by social concerns.

Organisation(en)

Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Externe Organisation(en)

Lund University, Uppsala University, University of Copenhagen

Journal

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Band

122

Seiten

648-674

Anzahl der Seiten

27

ISSN

0347-0520

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12353

Publikationsdatum

03-2019

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

502045 Verhaltensökonomie

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Economics and Econometrics

Link zum Portal

https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/de/publications/risking-other-peoples-money-experimental-evidence-on-the-role-of-incentives-and-personality-traits(8ca8008c-63e9-44ab-a13e-70a8b43b8767).html