Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice

Autor(en)

Thomas Markussen, Ernesto Reuben, Jean-Robert Tyran

Abstrakt

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

Externe Organisation(en)

University of Copenhagen, Columbia University in the City of New York

Journal

The Economic Journal

Band

124

Seiten

F163 - F195

ISSN

0013-0133

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12096

Publikationsdatum

02-2014

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

502024 Öffentliche Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Link zum Portal

https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/de/publications/competition-cooperation-and-collective-choice(02cbf7b4-ebc6-47e7-908f-9e3489c82baf).html